Abstract The present study quantifies the importance of price risk and irreversibility for investment in a corn stoverbased cellulosic biofuel plant. Using a real-option model, we recover prices of gasoline that would trigger entry into the market and compare it to breakeven price. Our analysis shows that the price premium (above breakeven) required by investors to enter the market due to risk is substantial. Managerial flexibility (embedded in the option of mothballing and reactivating the plant) does not sensibly reduce the entry premium. Results also show that price volatility may greatly reduce plants' responsiveness to gasoline prices and decrease supply elasticity. In combination, results suggest that (1) policies supporting second-generation biofuels may have fell short of their targets because of their failure to alleviate price uncertainty and (2) the use of price-based instruments such as reverse auctions, either in isolation or in combination with mandates, may be warranted.
Introduction
Over the past decade, the USA has increasingly pushed for the development of economical forms of renewable fuels. This is due to increased concerns over climate change, energy security, and the desire for domestic job creation. Biofuels in particular, and lately cellulosic biofuels, have received a large amount of attention due to their potential benefits in addressing these problems. The first renewable fuel standard was established in 2005 and expanded to the form used today with the passage of the second renewable fuel standard in 2007 (RFS2). The RFS2 requires, by the year 2022, 136 billion liters of biofuel (ethanol equivalent) to be used annually within the USA, 61 billion of which must come from cellulosic sources. It also sets a cap on the maximum amount of biofuel from corn ethanol at 57 billion liters.
Despite policy support and high gasoline prices, cellulosic biofuel production has continually fallen well short of mandates set forth by RFS2. In 2013, cellulosic biofuel production totaled 23 million liters, 3.76 billion liters below the target goal of 3.78 billion liters for the year, set by the RFS2 [1] . Numerous studies, in both business and academic realms, have routinely found that a cellulosic biofuel plant built today could have a positive mean return on the investment [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . However, they have also found that there is significant uncertainty around that mean. For instance, Petter and Tyner [6] found that the probability of economic loss is almost 50 %.
Unfortunately, the approach used by these studies (net present value of investment) does not allow calculation of an entry trigger price and, consequently, precludes quantification of the role of uncertainty on behavior. The present study applies real-option analysis to quantitatively evaluate the hypothesis that, due to the uncertain and irreversible nature of investment in this industry, investors in secondgeneration biofuels require a substantial premium, above and beyond breakeven gasoline price, that is not covered by currently observed prices. We also hypothesize that managerial flexibility (the possibility of mothballing and reactivating the plant) may reduce such premium. Our results offer insights into the inability of the RFS2 to trigger investment and discuss alternative or complementary policy instruments that can be more effective in addressing uncertainty.
Methods
Biofuels are defined as "transportation fuels like ethanol and diesel that are made from biomass materials" [8] . Currently, there are three main types (generations) of biofuels. Firstgeneration biofuels are produced from the sugars found in crops such as corn or sugar cane. These sugars are processed through various pathways to produce ethanol which is then blended with gasoline. Second-generation biofuels differ from first generation in that they are produced from cellulosic plant matter such as corn stover, switch grass, or trees rather than sugar [8] . They have also recently advanced to the point where the process produces a gasoline or diesel equivalent fuel referred to as a "drop in" instead of ethanol, which is subject to blending limits. Third-generation biofuels typically use algae or bacteria to break down a cellulosic feedstock to produce biodiesel [9] . This paper focuses on second-generation drop-ins. The advantage of a drop in is that existing combustion engines can burn it without any modifications. This chemical similarity to petroleum-derived fuels gives second-generation biofuels an advantage over ethanol as it eliminates constraints on blending [10] . Nine trillion dollars worth of transportation infrastructure exists in the USA to handle petroleum-based products [11] . Pipelines cannot transport ethanol, and most cars cannot burn a mixture that contains more than 10 to 15 % ethanol without damaging the engine [12, 13] . Wholesale gasoline price per liter is used as a proxy for the price received for a liter of drop-in biofuel as they are, by their chemical nature, perfect substitutes.
Investment in second-generation biofuels is subject to a great deal of uncertainty and irreversibility. There are many sources of uncertainty affecting investment in a biofuel plant [6] . First, there is market uncertainty. The price of gasoline, the cost of stover, hydrogen, and even equipment can vary over time. There is also uncertainty inherent within production, i.e., the amount of biofuel that can be produced per ton of biomass processed. In this study, we focus on uncertainty caused by volatility in output price, i.e., gasoline price. Several reasons motivate this choice. First, biofuel price is perhaps the most important determinant of plants' net revenue [6] . Second, once a biofuel market is well established, technical uncertainty and feedstock price uncertainty will likely diminish, whereas gasoline price uncertainty will remain substantial. Finally, volatility in gasoline price, in contrast to other sources of uncertainty, can be measured and its evolution over time can be modeled and quantified based on historical data.
In addition to being subject to a great deal of uncertainty, investment in a biofuel plant is also largely irreversible. Much of the equipment is specific to the industry. For instance, a tank used for pyrolysis may cost millions of dollars by the time it is installed but if the industry becomes unprofitable, it does not have many other uses. If one plant becomes unprofitable due to a systemic risk in the industry, such as low gasoline prices, the only other firms that would be interested in purchasing a pyrolysis tank would be firms in the same industry. They however would not buy it upon the initial plant's exit for anywhere near its purchase price since they would also be in a similar position.
Real Options Defined
Large-scale investment projects such as secondgeneration biofuel refineries have been evaluated from a net present value (NPV) point of view. The NPV model is centered on standard discounting. Projected revenue and costs are discounted from the future at a pre-specified discount rate. The summation of all of these expected discounted values are combined to compute the expected value of a project in the current period. An NPV analysis of biofuel plants can, and has, incorporated risk. An NPV that incorporates risk by modeling the probability distribution of stochastic variables over the life time of the project allows calculation of a probability distribution of NPVs [6] . Such analysis allows recovery of conditions under which the probability of a negative NPV is below some threshold.
Unfortunately an NPV approach is not designed to provide estimates of entry (or exit) trigger price. The breakeven price of output (i.e., the price that would result in zero NPV) can be calculated and used as a reference but previous literature [14] has convincingly argued that such measure greatly underestimates entry prices when investment is subject to substantial uncertainty and irreversibility. Such underestimation comes from the fact that a breakeven price based on the present value of future cash flows ignores the investors' option to wait and invest in the future. In other words, the price at which an investor, operating under rational expectations in an uncertain environment, is indifferent between investing and waiting cannot be recovered from an NPV.
One way of formalizing and quantifying the value of waiting and, consequently, the role of uncertainty in entry trigger prices is using a real-option analysis. Factoring uncertainty into the cost/benefit analysis for entry into the biofuel supply chain has recently gained popularity [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] but this approach has not been applied to the analysis of investment in a second-generation drop-in biofuel plant. This paper fills this gap by developing a real-option model of a plant's decision making for optimal entry, exit, mothball, and reactivation trigger prices for a second-generation corn stover-fed biofuel plant. Moreover, we calculate entry and exit trigger prices with a real-option model that ignores the managerial flexibility embedded in mothball and reactivation. Solving a real-option model with and without mothball and reactivation allows identification of the risk premium required by investors to enter the market and the offsetting effect of managerial flexibility.
Investment States and Transitions
There are three different states a plant can be in: idle, active, or mothballed. In an idle state, a plant is not paying variable or capital costs since it has not been built yet. It is also not receiving income but has the option of activating in the future. An active plant pays an investment cost k to enter the market and then pays, every period, operating costs w, and earns revenue, P. An active plant also has the option of converting to a mothballed state in which the plant is not producing, but it is kept ready for potential reactivation.
To get to a mothballed state, an active plant must pay a fixed cost of E m and pays an ongoing operating mothball maintenance cost m to keep the plant in working order should it decide to use its option of reactivating in the future for a fixed cost r. In a mothballed state, a plant also has the option of exiting the industry. In the event that the firm decides to exit the market, it forfeits its mothball maintenance cost and gets a fraction of the initial capital, l, back. The plant would incur some costs for exiting but after combining them with the value it gets for selling the plant, we assume l to be positive. By exiting, a plant also loses its option to reactivate. The ability to switch between these different states is represented in Table 1 , where an X (-) indicates that transition from the state indicated in the row to the state indicated in the column, is (not) possible.
We denote output prices that trigger entry, mothball, exit, and reactivation under real options by P h , P m , P l , and P r , respectively. The output prices that trigger entry and exit under Marshallian behavior (waiting is not an option and expectations are myopic) are denoted by W h and W l , respectively. The wholesale price of a liter of bio-gasoline is denoted by P. This price is assumed to be log-normally distributed, and consequently, its change over time is modeled according to a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process. 1 GBM is a stochastic process that allows incorporation of a drift parameter and a random parameter governing the evolution of gasoline price. The GBM process is depicted as dP=µPdt+σPdz. A change in price (dP) is dependent upon a combination of the drift rate (µ) and the passage of time (dt). The change in price is also determined by a random shock (dz) in combination with the standard deviation, σ. The shock is a function of random noise and time, dz ¼ ε t ffiffiffiffi ffi dt p . The factor ε t is a random variable distributed standard normal, so the unconditional expectation of dz is equal to zero.
Value of an Idle Investment
Let us denote an idle project's discounted expected value by V 0 (P). An idle plant has no revenue or expenses, but can earn profits in the future if the option to enter is exercised and the plant is brought to an active state. As shown elsewhere [14] , the Bellman equation describing optimal behavior of a firm holding the option to invest in a project is as follows:
where δ is the discount rate dt is an infinitesimal time period, and the rest is as defined before.
Equation (1) simply states that the expected return on the investment opportunity over a time interval dt is equal to the project's expected rate of capital appreciation.
The value of the idle project, V 0 (P), is a function of gasoline price which is, in turn, a random variable following a geometric Brownian motion process. Applying Ito's Lemma yields:
Substituting dP (the GBM defined before) into (2) yields:
Substituting (3) into (1), dividing both sides by dt, and taking expectations results in:
Given that dz is proportional on ε t which is distributed standard normal, E t [dz]=0. Hence, Eq. (4) is simplified to:
Equation (5) constitutes a second-order homogenous ordinary differential equation. As such, it has the solution ( [14] , p. 
Parameters α and β capture and incorporate the uncertainty modeled by GBM into the model: vanishes when the project is idle as there is no value to the project when output price approaches zero. Therefore:
Value of an Active Investment
We denote an active project's discounted expected value by V 1 (P). A plant in an active state is producing biofuel and earning an ongoing net revenue stream (per liter) equal to P −w. The Bellman equation in this state is depicted by:
The value function V 1 is derived following the same procedure by which we derived V 0 . Such procedure results in:
where A 1 and B 1 are unknown constants and A 1 P −α and and B 1 P β capture the option value of mothballing the plant if output price decreases and the option value of mothballing if the output price increases, respectively. When the output price is sufficiently high to induce the firm to keep the plant active, B 1 P β converges to zero. Therefore:
We now look at a situation where a firm that has a mothballed plant has the option to reactivate or exit the market altogether.
Value of a Mothballed Investment
A firm with a plant in a mothballed state is experiencing an ongoing maintenance cost of m. The Bellman equation for a plant in a mothballed state is as follows:
By using the same procedure used for Eqs. (1) and (8) this expression converts to:
where A m and B m are unknown constants, A m P −α represents the option value of being able to exit, B m P β represents the option value of being able to reactivate, and mδ −1 represents the present value of maintenance cost if the plant never changes states. The option value to exit is positive only if the price decreases, and the option value to reactivate is positive only if the price increases which is why each option has only one term.
Deriving the Trigger Prices
Our representative plant has the option to switch from idle to active, active to mothballed, mothballed to exit, and mothballed to active at any given point in time. Each of these options will be exercised at a specific price which we denote by P h , P m , P l , and P r , respectively. These prices are referred to as trigger prices. Trigger prices are characterized by two conditions known as the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition at each switching point. The value matching condition depicts the output price at which the firm is indifferent between two states. Switching occurs when, due to a change in output price, the value of the project under the current state becomes lower than the value of the project under the state to which the firm would like to switch minus the switching cost. Switching costs are denoted by k, E m , r, or l when the firm switches to from idle to active, active to mothball, mothball to reactivation, and mothball to exit, respectively. The smooth pasting condition requires these value functions to be tangent to one another at the trigger price.
We start by looking at the trigger price for switching a biofuel plant from an idle state to an active state. The value matching condition occurs between these two states at a gasoline price we denote by P h . At this price, the value of the option to enter equals the value of an active project minus the fixed cost of switching states k:
The corresponding smooth pasting condition between these two states is as follows:
The value matching condition corresponding to the transition from active to mothball can be denoted by:
where P m represents the trigger price that will take a plant from an active state to a mothballed state and E m denotes the fixed cost of mothballing. The corresponding smooth pasting condition between active and mothballed states is as follows:
A mothball state has two options for switching states. It can change back to an active state for a fixed reactivation cost of r. It could also change back to an idle state and receive a net scrap value l. Since there are two options for this state, there needs to be two value-matching conditions and two smoothpasting conditions satisfied. The decision to move from a mothballed state to an active state occurs at P r . The valuematching condition for this is as follows:
The corresponding smooth pasting condition is as follows:
The value-matching condition between a mothballed state and an idle state is as follows:
We now substitute value functions (7), (10) , and (12) into their corresponding value matching Eqs. (13), (15), (17) , and (19) at their designated trigger prices and the derivative of the value functions with respect to P into the smooth-pasting Eqs. (14), (16), (18) , and (20) . These substitutions result in a nonlinear system of eight equations in eight unknowns. Four of these unknowns are trigger prices (P h , P m , P r , and P l ), and the other four are constants associated with the option value of switching states (A 1 , A m , B 0 , and B m ):
The first four equations constitute direct corollaries of the value-matching conditions, and the next four equations are derived from the smooth-pasting conditions. This system is solved numerically in Matlab using the code presented in Appendix A. Solution of the system without managerial flexibility (i.e., without the option to mothball and re-entry) is, in turn, presented in Appendix B.
Empirical Implementation

Price of Gasoline: Identification of the Stochastic Process
There is significant variation in gasoline price (P) from year to year. This variation in P over time can either evolve following a stationary or a non-stationary process. These processes are most simply and commonly modeled using a mean reversion or Brownian motion (including GBM) process, respectively [14] . Therefore, the validity of assuming a GBM as the datagenerating process (DGP) of gasoline prices is evaluated by conducting a unit root test for non-stationarity of the price series. If the change in price between two periods is not a function of the price in the first period, then a Dickey Fuller unit root test will fail to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity [21] and a GBM is more appropriate than a mean reverting process.
Mathematically, this explanation is modeled as P t −P t−1 =a +b(P t−1 )+e or, including a drift, P t −P t−1 =a+b(P t−1 )+cμ+e, where P t is the price in period t, P t−1 is the price lagged by one period, a is the intercept, e is the residual, and b is the slope which is the parameter to be tested. If b=0 (null hypothesis), the data is non-stationary and a GBM is an appropriate specification of gasoline prices. We conducted unit root tests under both specifications, i.e., with and without a drift. DickeyFuller tests were run with STATA based on average monthly wholesale gasoline prices in the Midwest for the past 20 years (Fig. 1) . The test fails to reject non-stationarity with the first specification (test statistic of −1.48) but rejects nonstationarity under the second specification (test statistic of −3.50). These answers give conflicting results.
There has been a large amount of debate in the literature over the similarity in results given by models using GBM and those resulting from use of mean reversion assumptions [22] [23] [24] . Based on that literature, a case for using a GBM process to model gasoline prices can be made despite these conflicting results. First, GBM has the advantage of analytical tractability [14] . Secondly, a mean reverting process converges asymptotically to a GBM process as the rate of mean reversion tends to zero [22] [23] [24] . Pindyck [22] and Metcalf and Hassett [24] argue that a Brownian motion is a good approximation even if the true DGP is a mean-reverting one as long as the speed of reversion is low.
We have estimated the rate of mean reversion to determine the appropriateness of a GBM as an approximation to the datagenerating process. In particular, we regressed the change in gasoline wholesale prices on its lagged price, with and without drift rate. Estimates of mean reversion, η, are highly sensitive to the period of time considered (subsets of the last 20 years) and range from zero to 0.66. Again, these estimates offer conflicting views. Henceforth, with the caveat that there is significant uncertainty on reversion speed, we assume gasoline prices follow a GBM process.
Given recent potential structural changes in the oil and gasoline markets, instead of extrapolating past price trends to the future, we use the US Energy Information Administration [25] 30-year projections for wholesale gasoline prices. This gives us a drift rate of 1.85 %. Unfortunately, the EIA offers no projections for standard deviation so extrapolation of past standard deviation is our only option. The yearly standard deviation in percentage changes in gasoline price over the past 5 years was 0.21 (0.35 over the last 20 years). For our base case analysis, we use the more conservative estimate since dramatic spikes in prices during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , and the subsequent crash in 2008, may result in overestimation of past, and consequently future, standard deviation of gasoline prices.
Consistently, with the assumption of GBM for gasoline prices, we have calculated the standard deviation of ln
as prices are assumed to be log-normally distributed [14, 15] . The standard deviation can be interpreted as the standard deviation of a 1 % change in price. We use prices in the Midwest since a stover-fed plant would most likely locate and sell there, due to high corn density and low transportation cost to local markets.
Fixed and Operating Costs
There are three main types of second-generation technology that converts cellulosic biomass into biofuels. These technologies are gasification, hydrolysis, and fast pyrolysis [26, 27] . We analyze the case of fast pyrolysis as it has been found to be the most cost-competitive process to produce drop-in biofuels [6, 27, 28] . Jan-93 Jan-94 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14
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Time Fig. 1 Average real wholesale gasoline price in the Midwest (PADD, area 2) [25] Unless otherwise noted, we use fixed and operating costs reported by Brown et al. [3] . These costs are summarized in Table 2 . The operating cost w is calculated by combining yearly operating cost in Brown et al. [3] , our calculations for capital replacement, and federal tax. Capital replacement is added into w to ensure an infinite life of the plant. 2 The cost of replacing capital is calculated by annualizing capital cost. We assume a 20 % effective tax rate on net income. Yearly operating cost is then divided by the number of liters of biofuel the plant produces a year. This paper breaks operating cost into four categories, stover cost, hydrogen cost, capital replacement cost, and miscellaneous. These costs are reported in Table 2 and were obtained from Brown et al. [3] 
Regarding the cost of feedstock, the literature offers a wide range of estimates. The predicted cost for one dry metric ton of stover delivered to the plant ranges from approximately $16 to $112 [29, 30] . Most predictions fall into a range between $40 and $101 [3, 4, 20, 31] . These discrepancies in predicted cost exist due to the fact that the corn stover market remains largely undeveloped and assumptions on nutrient replacement, soil effects of removal, corn yields, weather, and tillage vary widely across studies [32] . In this study, we assume that a refinery can purchase a ton of stover at $83 a dry ton, which seems a reasonable central tendency of previously reported estimates. Finally, while Brown et al. [3] assumed that 322 l of bio-gasoline can be obtained per metric dry ton of stover processed, Kior, which is currently the only commercial scale cellulosic biofuel drop-in plant reported, a yield of 273 l per metric dry ton (http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2013/ 08/12/kior-mulls-columbus-ii-facility-to-accelerate-path-toprofits-as-2013-production-forecast-is-cut/ Biofuels Digest 2013). Kior's reported value is used in this study. 3 In this paper, capital cost k is calculated as the present value of investment cost. The assumptions under which capital cost is calculated are reported in Table 3 . The construction period is 3 years. The plant pays back the investment cost with interest in full after 3 years of construction. Our model assumes 100 % loan financing for only the 3 years of construction. We then took the principal of this loan after 3 years, paid it all at once, and divided by capacity to obtain k. Notice that the financing assumption was only used to calculate the principal. This cost is then divided by the total number of liters produced in a year to get k=$2.62 per liter of plant capacity.
The parameters E m , r, l, and m are all calculated as percentages of k. Due to the infancy of this industry, there is little information on the costs associated with mothballing and reactivation for second generation drop in biofuel plants. Following Schmit et al. [15] , who conducts a real options analysis for a first generation corn ethanol plant, m was calculated as 0.025k and l was calculated as 0.25k. Slight modifications were introduced to E m and r relative to Schmit et al. [15] . Schmit et al. [15] adjust pre-existing estimates based on the scale of production of the plant they are analyzing and find that E m =0.05k and r=0.1k. We follow this procedure and adjust these figures to our plant which is approximately four times larger than the largest ethanol plant in Schmit et al. [15] . The adjustment results in E m =0.025k and r=0.05k. All parameter values used in our analysis are summarized in Table 4 .
Results and Discussion
Trigger prices resulting from numerical solution of the system (21-28) are reported in Table 5 . Trigger prices of entry, mothball, reactivation, and exit are denoted by P h , P m , P r , and P l , respectively. Entry and exit trigger prices calculated without managerial flexibility (without mothballing and reactivation) were obtained from value matching and smoothpasting conditions depicted in Appendix B and are also reported in Table 5 and denoted as b P h and b P l . The Marshallian entry trigger price, W h , is the long-run average cost, composed of operating cost and the interest on the sunk cost of investment, W h =w+ik ( [14] , pp 219). This is, essentially, the price at which the firm breaks even. The Marshallian exit trigger price, W l , is the average variable cost plus the interest on scrap value, W l = w+il ( [14] , pp 219), and the rest is as defined in Table 4 . Entry and exit trigger prices under Marshallian behavior (which assumes static expectations, as opposed to rational expectations assumed by real options) are also calculated and reported in Table 5 for comparison with real options.
Under parameter values in Table 4 , results suggest that uncertainty plays a major role in both the decision to enter and the decision to exit. The real-option entry trigger price, P h , is 50 % above the Marshallian entry trigger price, W h . The 2 The assumption of infinite horizon greatly simplifies the problem. On the other hand, this assumption may overestimate the entry trigger price. However, the upward bias generated by the infinite horizon assumptions has been found to become very small when time to maturity is 20 years [36] . Since cellulosic biofuel plants are typically assumed to operate for 20 years (e.g., [6] ; [3] ), we assume an infinite horizon. 0 A note of caution is in place here. Kior's primary feedstock is yellow pine, and previous studies suggest that there could be a yield reduction when converting from yellow pine to corn stover ( [37] ; [3] ).
real-option exit trigger price, P l , is 30 % lower than the Marshallian exit trigger price, W l . Our results demonstrate that, under our assumed level of uncertainty and drift rate, a Marshallian approach would greatly underestimate the price of gasoline that would trigger entry into the market. This, in turn, shows the importance of using real options to evaluate entry into the second-generation biofuel industry. Moreover, our results indicate that managerial flexibility has almost no impact on entry behavior. Having the option to mothball and reactivate later does not reduce entry trigger price (as conceptually expected). Similarly, managerial flexibility has no effect on exit trigger prices. Volatility and drift rate of gasoline price are not only critical drivers of these results but also highly uncertain parameters. Therefore, it is important to conduct sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of our results to changes in those parameters. Results from such sensitivity analysis are reported in Figs. 2, 3, 4 , and 5. We will discuss each in turn. Figure 2 shows how changes in volatility of gasoline price affect the trigger price for entry. This graph compares the real-option entry price (the price b P h is used so that the effect of uncertainty is not confounded with managerial flexibility) with Marshallian entry price.
As revealed by Fig. 2 , the gap between W h and b P h vanishes under certainty, i.e., when σ=0. Increased uncertainty has no effect on Marshallian entry trigger price as this value assumes static expectations, so that a more volatile gasoline price in the future is not incorporated into current behavior. The realoption entry trigger price rises with increased gasoline price volatility as the real-option framework considers rational expectations [14] . Results show that investors will ask for a higher price premium to enter the market as gasoline price volatility increases. The real-option entry trigger price seems quite sensitivity to changes in volatility. It is worth noting that even if gasoline price volatility is halved (from currently observed 20 to 10 %), the real-option entry price is still 25 % higher than the breakeven price.
Uncertainty and irreversibility in investment may result in conservative firm behavior. Firms are less responsive to profitability signals because they are anticipating potential changes in these signals in the future. Technically, this inaction is called hysteresis and it denotes a situation in which firms tend to maintain the status quo and avoid switching to other states. Figure 3 illustrates the link between uncertainty and hysteresis. If gasoline price varies within the entry and reactivation boundaries in Fig. 3 , idle plants will not be activated and Construction time 3 years Wright et al. [28] Percentage of investment in year 1 8 Wright et al. [28] Percentage of investment in year 2 60 Wright et al. [28] Percentage of investment in year 3 32 Wright et al. [28] Interest rate 7.5 % Wright et al. [28] PV of investment cost (after interest) $470,350,236 Author's calculation Liters of bio-gasoline produced per year 180,000,000 l Author's calculation [15] active plants will not be mothballed. If gasoline price varies between the reactivation and mothball boundaries, idle plants will not be activated, mothballed plants will not be reactivated, and active plants will not be mothballed. Moreover, if gasoline price varies between the exit and mothball boundaries, idle plants will not be activated, and mothballed plants will not be reactivated or sold. Figure 3 reveals that these zones of hysteresis widen as gasoline price volatility increases. The positive link between uncertainty and hysteresis has important policy implications. First, an increase in gasoline price volatility, which has been the case over the past decade [25] , makes firm entry into the market more unlikely. This result suggests that, if policies designed to support biofuels remain unadjusted, recent increases in gasoline price volatility may have greatly diminished their effectiveness and their likelihood of success. Second, the volatility in gasoline price is associated with volatility in oil prices. Therefore, as volatility of oil price rises, hysteresis in the biofuel market will increase (as indicated by a widening of the vertical distance between lines) resulting in an increasingly inelastic industry supply. The inelastic nature of supply may generate large swings in bio-gasoline prices as production levels adjust lethargically to demand shocks. Therefore, supply inelasticity exacerbates the volatility of bio-gasoline prices relative to oil and regular gasoline, reducing even more the effectiveness of biofuel policies. Figure 3 also reveals that mothball and exit trigger prices converge at 25 % volatility. This means that firms will not be interested in mothballing the plant at low prices for levels of price volatility of 25 % or lower. At these levels of uncertainty, if the price drops significantly, the firm will exit the market without mothballing the plant first. When uncertainty is low enough, profitability signals embedded in gasoline price are taken with certain degree of confidence; i.e., they are not expected to change significantly in the future. This makes firms less likely to switch to intermediate states such as mothballing. A high cost of mothballing, all else constant, will also make firms less likely to switch to that state. Therefore, for a given vector of costs associated with entry (k), mothball (m and E m ), reactivation (r), and exit (l), there will be a level of uncertainty that is low enough to reduce the value of mothballing to zero. Figure 3 reveals that, given our estimated costs, that level of uncertainty is 25 %. Note, finally, that under 25 % volatility, the reactivation trigger price is trivial since that plant will never be mothballed and, as a result, will not be reactivated.
It is important to compare, at our assumed levels of volatility and drift rate, the inactivity zone under real options to the inactivity zone under Marshallian entry and exit trigger prices. The difference reveals the importance of firms' expectations formation process on behavior. With a 20 % volatility in gasoline price and 1.85 drift rate, no entry or exit occurs under myopic expectations (Marshallian prices) between $0.87 per liter and $0.73 per liter. Under the same volatility and drift rate, the range of inaction under rational expectations (real-option prices) takes place between $1.29 and $0.51. This demonstrates that, under rational expectations, firms incorporate future potential changes in profitability signals and, consequently, behave much more conservatively. This suggests that using breakeven analysis or NPV, even incorporating risk, Fig. 3 The impact of uncertainty on hysteresis may greatly overestimate firms' reactions to changes in prices driven by policy or market conditions due to their failure to incorporate rational expectations. The positive drift rate calculated for wholesale gasoline price reveals an expected improvement in profitability. We explore whether such expected improvement in future profitability affects entry trigger price and to what extent that effect is magnified or softened by uncertainty and irreversibility. Figure 4 displays the relationship between drift rates and entry trigger prices under real options and Marshallian behavior.
An increase in drift rate has conflicting effects on realoption entry trigger price. 4 On one hand, a higher drift increases the value of waiting since profitability conditions become more favorable in the future (i.e., because future prices are discounted by δ−µ). On the other hand, a higher drift lowers the likelihood of negative outcomes in the short run, making investment now more attractive. The latter effect dominates the former so that increases in the drift rate reduce entry trigger prices under rational expectations. Since Marshallian behavior assumes myopic expectations, the Marshallian entry price is not affected by the future trajectory of gasoline price. Therefore, increases in the drift rate decrease the price premium required by investors to enter the market above and beyond the breakeven price (i.e., long-term average cost).
Results in Fig. 4 suggest that policies aimed at increasing the future price of bio-gasoline without substantially reducing uncertainty may not be very effective at inducing entry into the market. As shown in Fig. 4 , while increases in drift rate are associated with lower entry trigger price, the reduction in such price is very modest. Therefore, these results may offer an explanation to the fact that quantity instruments, namely, the RFS2, have not been very effective. On the other hand, price instruments, which by design reduce price uncertainty, may be much more effective as suggested by results in Fig. 3 . Figure 4 also displays the real-option exit trigger prices so that we can explore the sensitivity of hysteresis (the range of inaction) to the drift rate. While higher drift rates slightly decrease hysteresis (i.e., the distance between entry and exit frontiers), they do so at a small rate. In fact, the drift rate has a close-to-proportional effect on entry and exit trigger prices. Hence, uncertainty and irreversibility, as opposed to drift rates, are the main drivers of hysteresis within the biofuel industry. Therefore, this furthers the argument that policies that increase drift rate, in addition to being relatively ineffective at inducing entry, may also be ineffective at increasing the elasticity of aggregate bio-gasoline supply.
The cost or even the possibility of mothballing and reactivation assumed in this study are highly uncertain, as there are no market observations based on which these can be assessed. It is then important to understand entry and exit behaviors when such flexibility is not available to firms. Managerial flexibility enhances the profitability of plants facing random prices. Therefore, it is expected that managerial flexibility will alleviate uncertainty and reduce the price premium required by investors. Consequently, the absence of managerial flexibility should raise the price premium required by investors but the magnitude of such increase is unknown.
Fortunately, our framework allows calculation of trigger prices without managerial flexibility as well as with flexibility. This allows us to determine not only the price premium for entry without flexibility but also the magnitude of the offsetting effect of flexibility on uncertainty and irreversibility. Real-option entry trigger prices with and without flexibility and Marshallian entry trigger price are plotted in Fig. 5 . The price premium required for entry is depicted by the vertical distance between these lines. Results in Fig. 5 suggest that managerial flexibility has virtually no effect on the price premium required by investors at all levels of uncertainty. Therefore, the absence of flexibility would not worsen the prospects of entry into the industry. In other words, our results in terms of price premiums for entry are robust to the assumption of flexibility held in this study. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study has used a real-option approach to compute the premium (above and beyond breakeven price) that investors would require on the price of gasoline to enter the biofuel market. It has also computed mothball, reactivation, and exit trigger prices for a range of uncertainty levels, captured by the volatility of percentage changes in gasoline price. Our analysis reveals that uncertainty is likely a significant barrier to market entry in the cellulosic biofuels industry. It also reveals that managerial flexibility, if technologically viable, does not alleviate the effect of uncertainty on the price premium required for entry. Moreover, there seems to be significant potential for hysteresis in this market which will greatly inhibit supply response to demand shocks, magnifying price volatility. Hysteresis is positively associated with gasoline price volatility. Expectations of future increases in gasoline price (positive drift rate) help the prospects of the cellulosic biofuel industry only to a small degree.
The US government has, so far, implemented a quantitybased policy (RFS2), by which gasoline blenders are forced to purchase a minimum amount of biofuels. Yet, this policy has failed to achieve the stated targets. Our analysis may offer some insights into the failure of the RFS2. Mandates impose a lower bound on demand. This demand level would, in theory, intersect supply at a price that is high enough to induce the desired production. However, an aggregate supply does not currently exist in the cellulosic biofuel industry, so the price that would result from the intersection of supply with the government mandated demand is unknown. Therefore, this policy fails to address price uncertainty which, according to our analysis, may severely dampen its effectiveness. Other policies that have been implemented alongside the RFS2 are subsidies to lower production cost (e.g., biomass crop assistance program) and programs that enhance financing conditions. While both policies may result in a reduction of entry premiums (by reducing w and k, respectively), they also fail to address the price uncertainty that introduces a wedge between breakeven price (Marshallian entry price) and real-option entry trigger price.
These insights suggest that price-based policy instruments, by directly hindering output price volatility, may be more effective than renewable fuel standards. Therefore, policy instruments such as reverse auctions or minimum prices could be viable avenues to end with the chronic production shortage that has forced the government to repeatedly waive the RFS2. Our analysis demonstrated that reductions in price volatility, even if leaving future trend of gasoline price unaffected, can substantially reduce the price premium required by investors to enter the market.
However, under zero bio-gasoline price volatility, the entry trigger price is reduced to $0.89 per liter. While this price is 31 % lower than entry trigger price under current volatility ($1.29/l), it is still higher than the wholesale price of gasoline (around $0.75 in the last 2 years). This suggests that uncertainty-reducing policies may not be sufficient by themselves to increase biofuel production. Similarly, our analysis indicates that policies that increase expected price but do not reduce uncertainty would require a subsidy that is approximately 50 % of current price. This seems too costly to be implemented by the government. Therefore, an instrument capable of reducing uncertainty and increasing the mean of bio-gasoline price, simultaneously, seems warranted if the cellulosic biofuel industry is to fulfill the mandate embedded in the RFS2. Some instruments previously discussed in the scholarly literature (e.g., [6, 17, 33] ) like reverse auctions or minimum price entail such combination.
A reverse auction is a contract by which the government guarantees the producer the purchase of a given volume of biofuels at a contract price. If the market price is lower than the contract price, the government makes the purchase. Otherwise, the producer sells the fuel in the market. Hence, reverse auctions work, in effect, as a minimum price. This policy has two effects. It reduces downside risk without curtailing upside outcomes. This results in reduced price volatility and increased drift rate. Both effects, but particularly the former, would reduce the price premium required by investors to enter which enhances the effectiveness of the policy.
Another option is to combine price-and quantity-based policy instrument to achieve stated biofuel inclusion targets. For instance, a mandated volume can be maintained through the RFS2 but combined with a reverse auction or forward contract. A reverse auction can be used so that entry price is reduced and an aggregate supply developed. Mandates can then be established in accordance with built capacity which makes the mandate easier to enforce. As the industry develops, price instruments can be phased out and the mandate can be maintained. The framework used in this study can be adapted to model and quantify the effect of these policy instruments. In addition, the cost at which each instrument can reduce entry price to a certain target can be calculated so that alternative instruments are evaluated based on cost-effectiveness. This seems like a promising avenue for future research.
There is also a dynamic dimension to policy design whose importance is underscored by our results. Our analysis indicates that policy interventions that do not adjust to changes in market conditions may fail to deliver the desired goal. Empirical evidence shows that volatility in oil markets has undergone structural changes in the recent past (e.g., [34] ). Structural changes that increase volatility of oil and gasoline prices ( [34] found evidence of such increase in 2008) call for more aggressive biofuel policies, as investors will require a higher premium in response to increased uncertainty.
This study is not without limitations. The study focuses on gasoline price uncertainty and does not account for the uncertainty inherent within production. The cost of stover, hydrogen, and even equipment can all vary over time. A model that accounts for multiple sources of uncertainty may provide information as to whether these sources operate linearly on entry price, or they interact to produce nonproportional effects on the entry premium [35] . Another limitation of this study, and one shared with other studies in this literature, is the uncertainty surrounding parameter values such as plant cost and its relationship with scale of production. While all sources of information have been documented here, only one large-scale plant with this technology exists (KIOR), limiting the reliability of these figures. However, these analyses could (and should) be re-run once new information arrives. Our framework easily allows for such exercise. ((delta-mu)^-1)+alpha*x(5)*(x(3)^(alpha-1))-alpha*x(6)* (x(3)^(alpha-1))-beta*x(8)*(x(3)^(beta-1)); alpha*x(6)*(x(4)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(4)^(beta-1))-((delta-mu)^-1)-alpha*x(5)*(x(4)^(alpha-1)); alpha*x(6)*(x(2)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(2)^(beta-1))-beta*x(7)*(x(2)^(beta-1))];
Second, we implement the following steps for solving the problem 
